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RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OF ACCRUED
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Martha Sheehy
I. INTRODUCTION
One express purpose of Montana's divorce law is to make rea-
sonable provisions for the spouse and minor children.1 In fulfilling
this purpose, the court may order a parent to pay a reasonable
amount of support.2 The financial condition of the supporting par-
ent, however, often changes. In recognition of this possibility, our
laws allow the modification of support upon motion to the court
under certain circumstances.3
Until 1986, the Montana Supreme Court refused to modify
retroactively accrued child support payments. Statutory law and a
long line of cases supported this position. In July of 1986, the court
changed its course and allowed past-due child support payments to
be modified, basing the decision on equitable considerations. This
comment will trace the development of this new rule, compare it to
the law in other states, and discuss the implications of the court's
action.
II. OTHER STATES: RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION ALLOWED
The Montana Legislature adopted the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act in 1975. Part of this act, section 40-4-408(1), specifies
that "[a] decree may be modified by a court as to maintenance or
support only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion
for modification."'4 Therefore, maintenance and support in a decree
are judgments which are not subject to retroactive change.5 Once a
payment comes due, section 40-4-208(1) precludes the court from
modifying, cancelling, or changing it.
The Montana Legislature enacted section 40-4-208(1) as part
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Six other
states-Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Wash-
ington-have also adopted the Act. All of these states have con-
fronted the issue of whether past due child support can be modi-
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-101(4) (1985).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-204 (1985).
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208 (1985).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(1) (1985).
5. See In re Marriage of Cook, Mont .... 725 P.2d 562, 566 (1986), hold-
ing: "The general rule is that when child support becomes due under a dissolution decree it
becomes a judgment debt similar to any other judgment for money."
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fled. While each state asserts that support provisions cannot be
retroactively altered, all these states have carved out exceptions to
this potentially harsh rule.
Among the states governed by the Uniform Act, Washington
adheres most strictly to the provision that support provisions can
be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the mo-
tion for modification. In Washington, courts are allowed to credit
payments made directly to the children against past due install-
ments.6 Overpayments may be set off for equitable reasons against
arrearages on a case-by-case basis.7 Other than these limited con-
cessions, the Washington courts hold that accrued installments are
vested and cannot be retrospectively modified.'
The other states acknowledge equity as an ameliorating force.
Illinois and Missouri recognize defenses to the automatic judgment
against a parent behind in his payments. Equitable estoppel and
waiver exist as defenses in Illinois,9 while Missouri allows for com-
promise of settlement of the arrearage between the parties,"° and
recognizes waiver." Arizona courts allow equitable relief in the
form of waiver and defenses such as laches.1' In Colorado, courts
have the authority to dole out equitable relief as circumstances
require.13
When enacting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the
Kentucky Legislature omitted the phrase used in Montana's sec-
tion 40-4-208(1), "only as to installments accruing subsequent to
the motion for modification and."" As a result, Kentucky's courts
are not bound by statute to enforce judgments against child sup-
6. See Martin v. Martin, 59 Wash. 2d 468, 473, 368 P.2d 170, 172-73 (1962).
7. See Mathews v. Mathews, 1 Wash. App. 838, 843, 466 P.2d 208, 211 (1970), holding
that if the obligated spouse can establish equitable considerations, justifying credit against
unpaid installments without injury to child or custodial parent, the court may exercise its
equitable powers. See generally In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wash. App. 292, 301, 600 P.2d
690, 696 (1979).
8. See Koon v. Koon, 50 Wash. 2d 577, 579, 313 P.2d 369, 371 (1957). The court held
that "[t]he settled jurisprudence of Washington is that accrued installments of support
money are vested and may not be retrospectively."
9. See Hoos v. Hoos, 86 Ill. App. 3d 817, - , 408 N.E.2d 752, 755 (1980). See gener-
ally Ruster v. Ruster, 91 Ill. App. 3d 355, 414 N.E.2d 927 (1980).
10. See Penney v. White, 594 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). See also Kennedy
v. Kennedy, 575 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
11. See State ex rel. Div. of Family Serv. v. Willig, 613 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
12. See Cordova v. Lucero, 129 Ariz. 184, 629 P.2d 1020 (1981); Corbett v. Corbett, 116
Ariz. 350, 569 P.2d 292 (1977).
13. See generally Griffith v. Griffith, 152 Colo. 292, 381 P.2d 455 (1963); Carey v. Ca-
rey, 486 P.2d 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Partridge v. Partridge, 601 P.2d 662 (Colo. Ct. App.
1979); In re Franklin, 634 P.2d 1032 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
14. Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.250 (1986).
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port debtors. Although Kentucky's statutory law does not preclude
modification of past due child support installments, Kentucky's
case law parallels that of the other states governed by the Uniform
Act: while accrued payments are considered vested, equitable relief
is allowed under compelling circumstances. 5
These states have applied equitable principles to soften the
harsh results of strict adherence to the modification of decree pro-
visions. Recent decisions have brought Montana law in line with
that of the other jurisdictions governed by the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act.
III. THE OLD RULE: STRICT ADHERENCE TO STATUTORY LANGUAGE
In enacting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the Mon-
tana Legislature enacted section 40-4-208(1), allowing modification
of support only as to installments accruing subsequent to the mo-
tion for modification. Even before the adoption of the Act, the
Montana Supreme Court refused to modify a divorce decree so as
to cancel past due installments. In Kelly v. Kelly, 6 the divorce de-
cree gave custody of two children to the mother, and ordered the
father to pay $25 per month in support. The mother placed the
children in the care of her aunt and uncle. The father never paid
support because the children were not in the custody of their
mother. 17 The court refused to cancel the support arrearages, stat-
ing, "The decree is not subject to modification as to installments
past due and unpaid."'18
Until recently, the court consistently reaffirmed this holding.
In Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald," the district court held that it would
be unconscionable to require the father to pay support arrearages
since visitation between the father and the child had never been
established.2 0 The Montana Supreme Court reversed this ruling,
holding that decree provisions concerning visitation have no bear-
ing upon the legal and moral obligations to support a child; a di-
vorce decree cannot condition the support obligation on the exer-
cise of visitation.2 1
The court addressed the issue again in Williams v. Budke.22 In
15. See generally Dalton v. Dalton, 367 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1963).
16. 117 Mont. 239, 157 P.2d 780 (1945).
17. Id. at 242, 157 P.2d at 781.
18. Id. at 244, 157 P.2d at 783.
19. - Mont. -, 618 P.2d 867 (1980).
20. Id. at -, 618 P.2d at 868.
21. Id.
22. 186 Mont. 71, 606 P.2d 515 (1980).
1987]
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that case the father moved for modification of his child support
obligation. His financial situation had changed drastically as a re-
sult of an inability to work after open-heart surgery. In addition to
reducing the father's future child support payments, the district
court granted him credit against accrued payments for $970 which
he spent directly on the children, and established a deferred pay-
ment schedule for the remaining arrearages.2 3 The supreme court
held that the district court erred in granting a credit for voluntary
expenditures. Granting such credit allows the father to substitute
his own judgment for that of the custodial parent, and this violates
the spirit of the divorce decree.2
The Williams court also held that the district court retroac-
tively modified the judgment for accrued child support payments
in the establishment of a deferred payment schedule. 5 The defer-
ral of payments deprived the wife of her right to levy execution for
the arrearage if property could be found in the possession of the
father which could be applied to the accrued payments.26 The
court felt compelled to uphold the strict wording of section 40-4-
208(1), but recognized the district court's good intentions:
We appreciate the effort of the District Court to take cognizance
of the financial condition of husband in establishing the deferred
schedule. However, the result, as the court ordered it, is to modify
the judgment previously entered in the District Court as to the
accrued child support payments. This action of the District Court
is oppugnant to a controlling statute.2
The court fought off further oppugnancies in other cases. The
district court in Dahl v. Dahl28 cancelled delinquent support pay-
ments, reasoning that the divorced wife's use of the house offset
any arrearages in support payments.2 9 The supreme court again
stated that a divorce decree cannot be modified to cancel past due
and unpaid child support.30 In another case, State Department of
Revenue v. Dawson,3 1 the court set aside a district order re-
straining the state from levying on a father's bank account to en-
force a child support decree.32 The court held that the practical
23. Id. at 75, 606 P.2d at 516-17.
24. Id. at 75, 606 P.2d at 517.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 77, 606 P.2d at 518.
27. Id. at 75, 606 P.2d at 517.
28. 176 Mont. 307, 577 P.2d 1230 (1978).
29. Id. at 310, 577 P.2d at 1232.
30. Id.
31. __ Mont. -, 674 P.2d 1091 (1984).
32. Id. at -, 674 P.2d at 1093.
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4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 48 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/7
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
effect of the district court's order was to defer the mother's right to
levy execution on accrued child support payments, and that this
constituted retroactive modification of the support award.38
The foregoing cases illustrate the attitude towards retroactive
modification of accrued child support which existed until 1986.
The Montana Supreme Court upheld section 40-4-208(1) at all
costs, disregarding equitable considerations and possible defenses.
IV. THE EVOLVING RULE: RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION ALLOWED
IN CERTAIN CASES
In 1986, the Montana Supreme Court abandoned its steadfast
adherence to the language of section 40-4-208(1). After decades of
refusing to modify past due child support installments, the court
suddenly changed its course. In State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Horton,34
the collection of child support arrearages was barred, based on eq-
uitable principles.
The Hortons divorced in 1970. The divorce decree provided
that the father pay $50 per month in support of the child. How-
ever, the mother and father agreed orally that if the father stayed
away from the mother and the child, they, in turn, would stay out
of his life. Both parties lived according to this agreement until
1984, when the mother brought action against the father to collect
$8850 in past due child support. The father never saw the child or
knew of its whereabouts.3 5
The district court recognized that under section 40-4-208(1),
unpaid child support installments cannot be retroactively modified
by a court.36 The court also noted that "child support and child
visitation are separate incidence, neither being dependent or con-
ditioned upon the other. '3 7 However, the circumstances of the case
compelled the court to consider the inequity which could be
wrought by these legal principles:
[The mother] can turn the clock backwards on the understanding
which was entered into and became consummated by mutual ob-
servance over the years, and create a financial windfall situa-
tion-one that can be pursued through County prosecuting offices
by filling out and signing forms in a local office without any per-
sonal expense to her.
The father and the child, on the other hand, cannot turn the
33. Id.
34. __ Mont. __, 722 P.2d 1148 (1986).
35. Id. at __, 722 P.2d at 1149-50.
36. Id. at __, 722 P.2d at 1150.
37. Id.
1987]
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clock backwards to recapture the association which they should
have had and could have had, except for the agreement which was
made and has been followed. 8
The supreme court adopted the memorandum and order of
the district court, and thereby barred the collection of past due
child support.8 9 The court carefully narrowed the holding, noting
that previous case law stands; each installment under an order for
child support is still non-modifiable when it falls due. Blakeslee
simply upholds the right of a district court to exercise discretion
and to apply the accepted principles of equity.40
The supreme court again faced the issue of modification of
past due support payments in In re Marriage of Cook."1 The par-
ties divorced in January of 1980. The divorce decree awarded cus-
tody of the two children to Dieta, the mother, and required James,
the father, to pay $250 per month per child for support. The court
recognized "the mutual desire of the parties to have the children
pursue a parochial education" in setting that amount. The decree
also required Dieta to obtain permission of the court before mov-
ing out of Montana with the children. 2
In May of 1980 Dieta moved with the children to Utah. The
children no longer attended parochial schools. 43 In June, the par-
ties agreed to reduce the support to $200 per month per child for
the months August through June, and to $100 per child for July. In
the years following, the parties acted according to this agreement."
In July of 1983, James filed a motion to modify custody, which the
court granted on January 23, 1985. In February, James moved the
court to determine the nature and extent of his support obligation.
The district court held that Dieta was estopped from enforcing the
support provisions of the decree from and after the oral agreement
of June 1980.4' Dieta appealed this finding based on section 40-4-
208(1).
The district court's decision was upheld by the Montana Su-
preme Court.4" The Cooks' oral agreement modifying support pay-
ments estopped Dieta from enforcing the provisions in the divorce
decree. The court declared that "the provision of 40-4-208, MCA,
38. Id.
39. Id. at , 722 P.2d at 1149.
40. Id. at -, 722 P.2d at 1151.
41. - Mont. - 725 P.2d 562 (1986).
42. Id. at , 725 P.2d at 563.
43. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 565.
44. Id.
45. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 564.
46. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 566.
[Vol. 48
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providing that a decree may be modified by a court as to mainte-
nance or support only as to installments accruing subsequent to
the motion for modification, is subject to the doctrine of equitable
estoppel . . . 2"7 However, this doctrine may only be applied
where the trial court finds "clear and compelling evidence" of a
need to override the provisions of the statute.48
Justice Weber, joined by Justices Turnage and Gulbrandson,
dissented in Cook." He found reason to uphold the strict language
of section 40-4-208(1). The statute is part of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act. The Act itself states that its general purpose is to
make the law uniform among those states which enact it.5o In addi-
tion, Justice Weber asserted that the majority disregarded section
40-4-208, which contains the legislative view of the power of the
courts to modify support payments.5 1 The legislature limited the
district court's power, allowing modification only as to installments
accruing subsequent to the motion to modify. Justice Weber be-
lieved that the legislature, not the court, should authorize modifi-
cation on equitable theories.5"
Despite these objections, Justice Weber joined the court in re-
affirming the application of equitable principles to the modifica-
tion of support in In re Marriage of Jensen.3 In June of 1981
Steve and Shirley Jensen orally agreed that during strikes and lay-
offs, or when he had custody of the children, Steve could reduce
his support payments. Steve's financial situation changed, and he
petitioned the court for a permanent modification of support pay-
ments. The district court modified the amount due in the future,
and found Steve responsible only for past due installments accru-
ing prior to the oral agreement." The supreme court affirmed the
district court's decision.
The Jensen court approved the application of equitable prin-
ciples in Blakeslee and Cook." These two cases authorized in Jen-
sen the enforcement of an oral agreement between the parties
which modified support payments. The court defined the rules re-
garding such enforcement, holding that a decree for support may
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. - Mont. at -, 725 P.2d at 566 (Weber, J., dissenting).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-102 (1985), states: "This chapter shall be so applied and
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law."
51. Cook, __ Mont. at -, 725 P.2d at 566 (Weber, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 568.
53. - Mont. -, 727 P.2d 512 (1986).
54. Id. at , 727 P.2d at 514.
55. Id. at -, 727 P.2d at 517.
56. Id. at -, 727 P.2d at 516.
19871
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be modified on equitable grounds based upon clear and convincing
evidence of an oral agreement of modification." In addition, the
court may only modify support payments made subsequent to the
oral agreement of the parties. 58 The terms of an agreement be-
tween the parties will only be enforced if the parties acted in good
faith and if their agreement does not impair the rights of any as-
signee of support payments based upon public assistance paid to a
party.5 9
The new rule allowing retroactive modification of support pay-
ments has developed quickly. The Blakeslee decision, based
squarely in equity, set down the general principle: accrued support
payments may be retroactively modified based on equitable con-
siderations. 60 Cook reaffirmed this position and clearly announced
that section 40-4-208 is subject to the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel.6 1 Jensen regulated the use of this doctrine by defining its pa-
rameters.6 2 While this evolving rule will be subject to further de-
velopment, it is clear that in compelling circumstances, the court
will apply equitable principles to bar the collection of unpaid child
support. Rather than allow the law, specifically section 40-4-208(1),
to bring about injustice, the court has found a remedy in equity.
V. IMPLICATIONS
While recent decisions conform with the development of law
in other states governed by the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
they signify a departure from Montana law. This state's highest
court, which heretofore staunchly upheld the language of section
40-4-208(1), now allows equitable considerations to soften the stat-
ute's requirements. Such a change in the court's position creates
uncertainty; exactly where does the law stand? While the court's
opinions do not address all the questions raised by its decision,
many questions regarding the state of the law can be answered.
A. Compatibility of the Old and New Rules
The old and new rules concerning the modification of accrued
child support payments seem incompatible. Under the old rule, the
Montana Supreme Court refused to modify, cancel, or change child
support arrearages retroactively. In Blakeslee, under the new rule,
57. Id. at -, 727 P.2d at 515-16.
58. Id. at , 727 P.2d at 516.
59. Id.
60. - Mont. -, -, 722 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1986).
61. __ Mont. 725 P.2d 562, 566 (1986).
62. - Mont. -, -, 727 P.2d 512, 516 (1986).
[Vol. 48
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the court allowed fourteen years of arrearages to be completely
cancelled, citing equitable considerations as justification.6 3 In arriv-
ing at its decision, no prior cases enunciating the old rule were
overturned. Cook and Jensen reaffirmed the new rule without ad-
dressing contrary precedent.
Can these two rules co-exist? The court believes they can. In
Blakeslee, rather than reverse prior rulings or distinguish previous
cases, the court simply stated:
[W]e note that the instant case does not reverse or modify our
previous case law which holds that each installment under an or-
der for periodic child support is final and non-modifiable when it
falls due. We only hold that Judge Luedke's memorandum and
order constitutes a sound exercise of the District Court's discre-
tion and also is a correct application of accepted principles of eq-
uity in this state. 64
This statement indicates that although the old rule is still valid, it
is not always valid. The statute still reads "[a] decree may be mod-
ified by a court as to maintenance or support only as to install-
ments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification."65 The
court, however, seems to read the statute "a decree may be modi-
fied by a court as to maintenance or support for the most part only
as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for
modification."
In Jensen, the court sought to bridge the gap between the two
rules by setting standards for the new rule which parallel the stat-
utory standards of the old rule. The court required clear and con-
vincing evidence of an oral agreement and limited modification to
payments accruing after the oral agreement. 6 The court stated:
These conclusions are consistent with section 40-4-208, MCA,
which limits modifications to installments subsequently accruing,
and which also limits the power of the district court to modify,
except upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial
and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable where there
is no written consent of the parties.6"
While the court's conclusions may comport with the policies un-
derlying section 40-4-208, the conclusions are not consistent with
the statute itself. Section 40-4-208(1) limits modification of sup-
63. - Mont. at -, 722 P.2d at 1151.
64. Id. at -, 722 P.2d at 1150-51 (emphasis in original opinion).
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(1) (1986).
66. In re Marriage of Jensen, - Mont. 727 P.2d 512, 515-16 (1986).
67. Id. at -, 727 P.2d at 516.
1987]
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port to "installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modi-
fication," not subsequent to an oral agreement between the parties.
The new rule is not consistent with the statute's requirements; it
allows exceptions to those requirements.
In trying to bind the new rule allowing retroactive modifica-
tion of accrued support to the precedent requiring strict adherence
to the language of section 40-4-208(1), the court ignored the rela-
tionship between the two rules. The rules are compatible in the
sense that the new rule modifies, but does not abolish the old rule.
Generally, the old rule is still good law; generally, accrued child
support payments cannot be retroactively modified. However, ex-
ceptions to the rule will be recognized when equity so demands.6 8
In seeking to compare the rule and the exception, the court created
unnecessary confusion. The recognition of equitable exceptions is
not rare, since equitable principles are often used to soften the ef-
fects of a harsh rule."' The rule and the equitable exception co-
exist. Such is the case here.
B. Effect of the Evolving Rule
The rule that accrued support payments cannot be retroac-
tively modified is still good law, but now exceptions are recognized.
The making of exceptions is left to the district court, which is al-
lowed to use sound discretion and to apply accepted principles of
equity.7 0 This discretion, however, is not completely unfettered.
The court must consider the best interest of the child,7 1 act within
its discretion'7 and comply with the standards set down in Jen-
sen.7' These considerations limit the effect of the new rule allowing
retroactive modification of child support payments.
In matters relating to child support, the interests of the chil-
dren control. 4 Equitable relief which adversely affects the child
will not be granted; the court is bound to protect the children's
interests. The movement away from strict adherence to section 40-
68. State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Horton, - Mont. , -, - P.2d - . 43
St. Rptr. 1321, 1325 (1986).
69. In re Marriage of Cook, - Mont. 725 P.2d 562, 566 (1986).
70. Blakeslee, - Mont. at - , 722 P.2d at 1151. The court held that Judge
Luedke's order cancelling past due child support constituted "a sound exercise of the Dis-
trict Court's discretion and also is a correct application of accepted principles of equity in
this state."
71. In re Marriage of Carlson, - Mont. -, 693 P.2d 496, 499 (1984).
72. Blakeslee, - Mont. at - , 722 P.2d at 1151.
73. - Mont. -, -, 727 P.2d 512, 515-16 (1986).
74. Carlson, - Mont. at - , 693 P.2d at 499. The "best interests of the child"
doctrine is also reflected in Montana's statutes. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1985) pro-
vides: "The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child."
[Vol. 48
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4-208(1) may better enable the court to do so. Under a rigid inter-
pretation of the statute, a court has little flexibility. In Williams,
where severe medical problems greatly changed a father's ability to
keep up with his child support payments, the judge was not even
allowed to establish a deferred payment schedule for arrearages. 75
Today, a court may be able to apply equitable principles to reach a
solution which will not adversely affect the child, but will help the
troubled supporter. The Williams court "appreciate[d] the efforts
of the District Court to take cognizance of the financial condition
of the husband in establishing the deferred schedule. '7 6 The
Blakeslee court allows such efforts.
In addition to protecting the child, the district court's action
must be within its discretion in applying equitable principles. Eq-
uity comes into play in "circumstances where a litigant may be
remediless unless equity could afford him relief."'7 While such cir-
cumstances occur, they are not so common as to leave all matters
to the discretion of the judge.
The court's discretion is further limited by the standards set
down in Jensen. In that case, the supreme court required clear and
convincing evidence of an oral agreement between the parties and
allowed support to be modified only as to payments accruing sub-
sequent to the oral agreement.7 8 In addition, the agreement must
be made in good faith and it may not impair the rights of any as-
signee of support payments.7 0
Clearly these requirements must be met before a decree of
support may be equitably modified based on an oral agreement.
Language within Jensen suggests that equitable relief will only be
allowed on the basis of an oral agreement: "We therefore hold that
in Montana a decree for support may be modified on equitable
grounds by a court where there is clear and convincing evidence of
the terms of an oral agreement of modification." 80 The court noted
that in both Blakeslee and Cook oral agreements were enforced.
Whether the Jensen court limited retroactive modification to situ-
ations involving agreements between the parties or simply defined
the rules that apply to retroactive modification in the event of an
oral agreement is an open question. At the very least, the court has
recognized one common set of circumstances which requires the
75. Williams v. Budke, 186 Mont. 71, 75, 606 P.2d 515, 517 (1980).
76. Id.
77. Blakeslee, - Mont. at -, 722 P.2d at 1151.
78. Jensen, - Mont. at -, 727 P.2d at 512.
79. Id. at -, 727 P.2d at 516.
80. Id. at -, 727 P.2d at 515-16.
1987]
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application of equitable principles.
Under the evolving rule, judges have greater flexibility in de-
termining matters involving child support. The supreme court, in
abandoning the strict interpretation of section 40-4-208(1), in-
creased the amount of discretion available for the use of the dis-
trict court judge. This discretion, however, is limited; the control-
ling interest of the child and the nature of equity itself check the
judge's discretionary powers. In addition, the rules set down in
Jensen limit the court's action in cases concerning oral agreements
between the parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court set down a new precedent in
Blakeslee: accrued support payments may, in some cases, be retro-
actively modified. Cook and Jensen affirmed this precedent. These
cases represent a substantial departure from the court's previous
views. Despite the uncertainty that such a change creates, the deci-
sions enhance Montana law. Strict adherence to the language of
section 40-4-208(1) produces the potential for harsh results. When
the situation requires it, relief should be available, provided that
neither the child nor the custodial parent will be adversely af-
fected. It is safe to presume, in light of Jensen, that the Montana
Supreme Court will allow such relief in the future based on agree-
ments between the parties. It is unclear whether equitable relief
from strict adherence to section 40-4-208(1) is only available if
such an agreement has been made. However, at least when the par-
ties have agreed to modify support payments, and perhaps in other
compelling circumstances, the court will apply equitable principles
to bar collection of unpaid child support.
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